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Crisis demands government interventions that in-
crease budget defi cits and public debt
What would this look like in practice? First, national gov-
ernments must intervene on a massive scale to provide fi -
nancial support for distressed companies and households 
whose earnings are at risk. Most European governments 
already seem to be willing to do this. The problem is that 
large-scale fi scal expansions by eurozone member states 
could prove tricky, even if the Commission has tabled the 
activation of the general escape clause of the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP). It is thus critical that the European 
Central Bank (ECB) steps in to prevent the last domino – 
member state governments – from falling.
Because they have no choice but to support failing com-
panies, illiquid banks and struggling households, national 
governments could be entering dangerous territory. The 
more their debt increases, the greater the risk that their 
bondholders will panic, as we saw during the 2010-12 sov-
ereign debt crisis. And the countries experiencing the larg-
est debt increase as a result of the coronavirus crisis – Italy, 
Spain, and France – are three of the four largest eurozone 
economies.
ECB should provide monetary fi nancing of corona-
induced budget defi cits
To head off the risk of a bond market panic, the ECB an-
nounced its readiness to buy up distressed governments’ 
bonds. During the 2012 crisis, the ECB laid the ground-
work for such a response with its outright monetary trans-
actions program (OMT). The ECB went a step further in 
April 2020 by dropping all conditionality attached to the 
use of OMT. This was the correct decision. Yet it is in-
suffi cient. The ECB must go further, by preparing to buy 
government bonds in primary markets, effectively issuing 
money to fi nance member states’ budget defi cits during 
the crisis.
The virtue of such a monetary fi nancing is that it spares 
national governments from having to issue new debt. Be-
cause all new debt would be monetised, the crisis would 
not increase government debt-to-GDP ratios. For those 
countries suffering the worst of the pandemic, the threat of 
a bondholder panic will be removed from the equation. In 
addition, when the epidemic disappears it will not a leave 
permanent legacy of unsustainable levels of government 
debt.
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The coronavirus pandemic has triggered a combined 
negative supply and demand shock of unprecedented 
intensity. Both are having a signifi cant impact on the pro-
duction of goods and services, and because everyone’s 
income ultimately derives from production, household in-
comes are quickly falling. With many economies already 
in a downward spiral and heading towards recession, the 
danger is that the downturn will become a self-perpetuat-
ing and ever-deepening rout.
The twin supply and demand shocks are likely to trigger 
many ‘domino effects’. Companies with large fi xed costs 
that suffer a sudden fall in income are facing fi nancial 
diffi culties, or even bankruptcy. When that happens, the 
banks and other entities that have lent money to these 
companies will also be in trouble. That is why massive 
economic shocks can often lead to banking crises.
But the dominoes do not stop falling there. Governments, 
too, can face fi scal dangers when they step in to mitigate 
the crisis. In the case of the current pandemic, national 
governments will need to save businesses from bank-
ruptcy by granting fi nancial support and subsidies, assist 
workers by funding temporary unemployment schemes 
and possibly even come to the rescue of large banks. 
Worse, all of this must be done at a time of declining tax 
revenues, which means that government defi cits and 
public debt levels will skyrocket.
We saw how these domino effects work during the 2007-
08 fi nancial crisis. The difference now is that the initial 
shock did not start in fi nancial markets and then spill over 
into the real economy. Rather, today’s shocks emerged 
from the real economy and are toppling fi nancial markets. 
But, as in the past, this crisis demands urgent measures 
to put more space between the falling dominoes. Think of 
it as macroeconomic ‘social distancing’.
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certainly politically more independent than, say, the Bank 
of England, which can be forced by the UK government to 
provide monetary support. The ECB, in contrast, cannot 
be forced by any member state government to continue to 
provide monetary fi nancing to national governments. Thus, 
it appears that in the eurozone there is a stronger guar-
antee that the central bank will quickly want to return to a 
stability-oriented monetary policy.
A third objection is that monetary fi nancing is not really that 
different from government debt. When the central bank 
buys government bonds, it substitutes these bonds for 
monetary liabilities. The latter consist mainly of reserves 
that banks hold at the central bank. These reserves are re-
munerated with an interest rate by the central bank. Thus 
one type of interest bearing liability issued by the govern-
ment is substituted for another type of interest bearing lia-
bility issued by the central bank. As a result, in both cases, 
the liabilities of the consolidated public sector will require a 
debt service (including interest payments). This may not be 
much of a problem today when the interest rates are close 
to zero. But it will become one in the future when the cen-
tral bank wants to fi ght infl ation by raising the interest rate.
What to think of this objection? The problem with it is that it 
pretends that the remuneration of bank reserves is a nec-
essary feature of central banking. It is not. Until recently, 
central banks did not pay interest on bank reserves, much 
in the same way as they do not pay interest on banknotes. 
The remuneration of bank reserves is undesirable and 
should be abolished. When the central bank creates mon-
ey, it generates ‘seigniorage’, i.e. a profi t that arises from 
the fact that the government has granted a monopoly right 
to the central bank to create money (money base). This sei-
gniorage should, therefore, be transferred in its entirety to 
the Treasury and thus to the taxpayer. There is no good 
reason why part of this monopoly profi t should be distrib-
uted to commercial banks. Central banks should return to 
the historical practice of not remunerating bank reserves. 
In such a regime, there is a big difference between gov-
ernment bonds and money base. The former is an interest 
bearing liability of the public sector; the latter is not.
Time to think outside the box
Sooner or later, the ECB must accept that monetary fi nanc-
ing in support of defi cit spending is a necessity not just 
for mitigating the coronavirus crisis, but also for averting a 
downward defl ationary cycle that could pull the eurozone 
apart. It is time to think outside the box and to set aside dog-
mas that may be appropriate in normal times but not when 
we face an existential crisis. When the existence of a market 
system is at stake, all instruments that are available and that 
can be used to avert disasters should be on the table.
The monetary fi nancing of corona-induced budget defi cits 
is a form of ‘helicopter money’, i.e. the central bank pro-
vides cash to fi rms and households using the government 
budget as an intermediary. This is also the appropriate way 
to organise the distribution of helicopter money. It relies on 
the government to decide which households and which 
fi rms will receive the cash. The government is the appropri-
ate institution as it is vested with the democratic legitimacy 
to organise such a distribution of cash. This distribution 
method  is certainly superior to the many proposals that 
are being made today whereby each citizen would receive 
the same amount of cash (€1,000, for example). Such a 
cash distribution would be very ineffective to counter the 
defl ationary spiral because most of the cash would go to 
households that have not seen their revenues decline. They 
would likely hoard the largest part of the cash handout. 
Conversely those who are in greatest need, e.g. the tem-
porarily unemployed, and who are now forced to reduce 
their consumption would not receive a suffi cient amount of 
cash. A uniform cash handout would be hugely expensive 
in budgetary terms and mostly ineffective in stopping the 
defl ationary dynamics.
Objections to monetary fi nancing
There are many objections one could raise to this proposal 
of monetary fi nancing. As a legal matter, the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union forbids the ECB from 
engaging in monetary fi nancing of national budget defi cits 
(i.e. subscribing to newly issued bonds in the primary mar-
kets). I trust that EU lawyers, with their unbounded inge-
nuity, could surely fi nd a way around this restriction. One 
way this could be done is by national governments issu-
ing perpetual bonds with a zero interest rate that would be 
presented in the primary market and bought by fi nancial 
institutions. The latter would sell them to the ECB after a 
short delay in the secondary markets. There are probably 
better ways to circumvent the prohibition of monetary fi -
nancing. The important thing is to realise that in existential 
crisis situations, governments should use all instruments 
available to avert catastrophes. A self-imposed rule of no-
monetary fi nancing must then be set aside. Or as Cicero 
put it: Salus populi, suprema lex (the welfare of the people 
is the supreme law).
One might also object on the grounds that monetary fi -
nancing would produce infl ation. Yet under the current 
circumstances, the infl ationary risks are non-existent. If 
anything, Europe is now facing a defl ationary spiral; mon-
etary fi nancing of budget defi cits is the only way to stop 
this spiral. As soon as the defl ationary dynamic had been 
stopped, the ECB will surely halt its monetary fi nancing. In 
fact, one can expect that in this respect, the ECB is a more 
credible institution than most national central banks. It is 
